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NOTES
COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAINTS ON STATE
TAXATION OF ENERGY RESOURCES: A
SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1973 OPEC oil boycott, the nation has felt the pervasive
effects of higher energy costs. The cost of energy has a dramatic impact
on industry, the economy, and individuals' purchasing power.I When
industry, legislatures, or foreign governments make a decision altering
the cost of an energy resource, the nation is directly affected. As the
price of energy surges upward, energy expenditures require a larger rel-
ative percentage of income.2 Energy-rich states are increasing the cost
of energy by levying taxes on production of their energy resources,
even when produced predominantly for customers outside the taxing
states.3 Consumers and utilities have recently challenged several of
these state energy taxes on constitutional grounds.4 Because of the in-
creased significance of energy resources, the manner in which the
courts analyze and resolve these tax challenges is of paramount impor-
tance for the nation.
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN II at 1-3, 16-19 (May 1979) [here-
inafter cited as NEP II]; Serot, The Energy Crisis and the U.S. Economy, 1973-1975, in How
ENERGY AFFECTS THE ECONOMY 7-20 (A. Askin ed. 1978). See generally J. DARMSTADTER, J.
DUNKERLEY & J. ALTERMAN, How INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES USE ENERGY: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (1977); J. DuNKERLEY, TRENDS IN ENERGY USE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES: AN OVER-
VIEW (1980).
2. This statement presumes that demand for energy, regardless of the type, is fairly inelastic,
at least in the short run. For a more thorough discussion of this matter, see notes 126-52 infra and
accompanying text.
3. For a chart showing state severance taxes on coal, see Gills, 4 Tale of Two Minerals:
Severance Taxes on Energy Resources in the United States, in GROWTH AND CHANGE 60 (January
1979). For a chart showing state severance taxes on uranium, see id at 62. For data showing
coal's distribution in the United States, see U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY DATA REPORT. Bi-
TUMINOUS AND SUBBrruMiNOus COAL AND LIGNITE DISTRIBUTION, CALENDAR YEAR 1979
(1980).
4. See, eg., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981) (plaintiffs un-
successfully challenged Montana's severance tax on coal); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725
( 1981) (Maryland and other states successfully challenged Louisiana's tax on natural gas on com-
merce clause and supremacy clause grounds).
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Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, a recent challenge to a state
energy tax, demonstrates the conflict between state and federal interests
in such disputes. In Commonwealth Edison the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of Montana's Coal Severance Tax,6 which levied a
charge on coal of up to thirty percent of the coal's contract value.7 Pro-
ducers shipped as much as ninety percent of Montana's coal, more ex-
pensive because of the severance tax,8 to other states.9 Montana
5. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
6. See MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -I11 (Supp. 1981). The state imposed a
severance tax on each ton of coal produced according to the following schedule:
Heating quality Surface Underground
(Btu per pound Mining Mining
of coal):
Under 7,000 12 cents or 5 cents or
20% of value 3% of value
7,000-8,000 22 cents or 8 cents or
30% of value 4% of value
8,000-9,000 34 cents or 10 cents or
30% of value 4% of value
Over 9,000 40 cents or 12 cents or
30% of value 4% of value
Id at 15-35-103.
7. More specifically, the value of the coal is determined by the "contract sales price."
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-35-103 (Supp. 1981). At least 50% of the revenues generated by
the tax were, since January 1, 1980, paid into a permanent trust fund for use of future Montana
citizens. MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 5.
8. One commentator defined a severance tax as "a levy assessed at flat or graduated rates by
a government on the privilege, process, or act of commercially severing or extracting natural re-
sources from the soil or water, and measured by the physical amount or the gross or net value of
the natural resources produced or sold." Lockner, The Economic Effect of the Severance Tax on
Decisions of the Mining Firm, 4 NAT. RESOURCES J. 468, 469 (1965). In light of this definition, this
Note uses the terms "severance tax" broadly to include production taxes, occupation taxes, gross
(or net) receipts taxes and ad valorem property taxes measured by the gross (or net) value of the
minerals produced. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMs 203, 352, 416 (4th ed.
1976).
9. See 101 S. Ct. at 2954. Montana coal is in high demand because The National Energy
Plan II and several related federal acts expressly encourage the use of coal, especially the low-
sulphur (and thus less polluting) coal found in the Northwest. See, e.g., Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, § 102(a)(2), 92 Stat. 3298; NEP II, supra note 1, at 9,
100-03. For a general summary of the relevant Congressional actions, see U.S. DEP'T OF ENEROY,
THE NATIONAL ENERGY AcT (1978) (reference information from the Department of Energy Of-
fice of Public Affairs). Montana and Wyoming control 68% of the nation's low-sulphur coal
reserves. See ProposedAmendments to the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 Hear-
ings on H..R 6625, H. 6654, and H 7163 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the
House Comm on Interstate andForeign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 274-75 (1980) (Statement
of Irwin M. Stelzer) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. "Together with Wyoming, Montana supplied
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asserted that the tax was justifiable on several grounds. First, the state
asserted that funding was necessary to finance governmental involve-
ment in the areas impacted by the coal mining industry. Second, Mon-
tana claimed that revenue was needed to prepare for economic
depression in the mining area once the mining ceased.' 0 The plaintiffs
contended, inter alia," that because nonresidents shouldered the bur-
den of the tax's disproportionately high rate, the tax violated the com-
merce clause 2 of the United States Constitution. The trial court 13
dismissed the complaint before trial on the merits and held as a matter
of law that the coal severance tax did not violate the commerce clause.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision.14 The
United States Supreme Court, in a split decision,' 5 ruled that Mon-
l(% of the United States' demand for coal in 1977; it is estimated that Montana and Wyoming
will supply 33% of the Nation's coal by 1990." 101 S. Ct. at 2965 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing Hearings, supra, at 22 (statement of Rep. Bruce F. Vento)).
10. Montana provided several other justifications for the tax. See Hearings, supra note 9, at
232-33 (reprinting prepared statement of Mont. State Senator Thomas E. Towe, Chief Sponsor of
Montana Coal Tax Law); Towe, Memorandum: Explanation of.Reasonsfor Montana's Coal Tax
2-3 (date not ascertainable) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly). For an expla-
nation of the tax's purposes, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the North Dakota State Tax Commis-
sioner at 3, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, - Mont. _, 615 P.2d 847 (1980). One
student commentator explained Montana's justifications as follows:
Montana justifies its severance tax on three grounds. First, Montana contends that it
may share in the profits from resources leaving the State. Fearing exploitation of its
mineral resources and seeking financial security, Montana has opted for short-term mon-
etary benefits. Second, although artifically high coal prices will decrease production in
the short term and may inhibit contracting and decrease total tax revenues over the long
term, the unmined coal will be preserved as a source of revenue for future generations.
Third, the severance tax ensures that Montana will not be destroyed in the coal rush. As
utility companies shun the highly taxed Montana coal, the ecological balance of the State
and the lifestyle of its citizenry should be preserved.
Note, The Increasing Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxation and Federal Energy Policy,
54 Tux. L. REv. 675, 676-77 (1979).
11. Plaintiffs made several supremacy clause claims. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants
at 20-27, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981); Jurisdictional Statement at 22-26, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981); Brief
Amicus Curiae of the State of Texas in Support of Jurisdictional Statement at 1-7, 101 S. Ct. 2946
(1981); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 57-89, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, - Mont.
615 P.2d 847 (1980).
12. "Congress shall have Power . .. [tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. .. ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The commerce clause is a means to engender national economic unity by prohibiting states
from conducting reprisals against other states. Further, it promotes federal uniformity. See Smith
v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 394 (1849); Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional
Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MiNN. L. REv. 432, 481-94 (1941).
13. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. July 27, 1979).
14. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, - Mont. at _ 615 P.2d at 848-58.
15. 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). Justice Marshall wrote for the majority and Justice White con-
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tana's tax did not offend the commerce clause.
16
Part II of this Note sets out the analytical framework established by
the judiciary for determining the constitutionality of state taxes chal-
lenged on commerce clause grounds.17 Part III discusses and analyzes
the Commonwealth Edison decision. In Part IV, this Note suggests that,
in light of the critical role energy now plays in society, courts should
modify their approach to commerce clause challenges of state energy
taxes. Part V focuses on alternative methods for regulation of state
exploitation of the nation's energy predicament.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE FRAMEWORK
A. The Relationship Between State Tax Case Analysis and State
Regulation Case Analysis
Whether in the form of regulations or taxes, state legislative actions
that affect interstate commerce are subject to the commerce clause.18
curred separately, id at 2964 (White, J., concurring), in the majority's result. Justice Blackmun
dissented, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
16. Id at 2952, 2960.
17. The scope of this Note is limited to commerce clause issues. The constitutional issues
involved in state energy tax challenges, however, are numerous. See generally C. DuMARS & L.
BROWN, LEGAL ISSUES IN STATE TAXATION OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 1 (1979); Van Baalen,
Mineral Export Legilation-Can It Withstand Preemption and Commerce Clause Challenges?, 12
LAND & WATER L. REv. 131 (1977); Note, The Effect and Validity of State Taxation of Energ
Resources, 58 WAsi. U.L.Q. 345 (1980); Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Severance
Taxes, 20 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 887 (1980).
18. See 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981) (Montana's severance tax on coal affects interstate commerce);
McClain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 442 U.S. 232 (1980) (real estate sales within a state
affect commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (federal civil
rights regulations apply to hotels because racial discrimination affected interstate travel of black
persons); Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482 (1953) (employment relationships in single
state enterprises arguably affect commerce); North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946) (federal
securities laws can apply to intrastate activities that affect commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) (federal wheat marketing scheme imposing requirements on intrastate farmers
upheld because total supply of wheat affects market price); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (manufacturing affects commerce). See generally L. TRmB, AMERICAN
CoNsTIToNAL LAW 236-37 (1978); note 87 infra and accompanying text.
Although many of these cases concern the positive power of Congress to reach intrastate activi-
ties under the commerce clause, the cases involving the negative implications of the commerce
clause power to restrict state activity rest on the same doctrine. The commerce clause has equal
power in both its positive and negative aspects. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447
U.S. 27, 38-39 (1980); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1978). "IT]he definition
of 'commerce' is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied
on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
326 n.2 (1979).
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The judiciary's analytical approach to resolution of commerce clause
challenges to state regulations and taxes has evolved significantly dur-
ing the past one hundred and fifty years.' 9 The doctrinal basis of judi-
19. In Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), Chief Justice Marshall declared
that the commerce clause impliedly prohibits all state taxation of interstate commerce. Id at
448-49. Marshall relied on McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), in reaching his
decision. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 449. The prevailing view after the 1827 Brown decision was that
the commerce clause vested the federal government with the exclusive power to regulate interstate
commerce. This exclusive federal power to regulate interstate commerce did not, however, pre-
vent states from exercising their police power over local matters such as safety, health and moral-
ity. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); P. HARTMAN, STATE
TAxATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 23 (1953). Courts distinguished between permissible state
police power enactments that affected commerce and impermissible state regulations on interstate
commerce. See id at 23. Under this view, activities involved in interstate commerce were im-
mume from state taxation. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 239-41 (4th ed. 1978). For a discussion of the early tax cases, see
Brown, State Taxation ofIntersiate Commerce, and Federal and State Taxation in Inter-governmen-
tal Relations 1930-32, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 247 (1933); Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal
Authoritj
, 
by the Taxing Powers of the States (Pts. II, 1I), 31 HARv. L. REv. 572, 721 (1918).
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), was the next case to affect signifi-
cantly commerce clause doctrine. In Cooley the United States Supreme Court established a long-
followed principle regarding the division of power of federal and state regulation of interstate
commerce. The Cooley Court divided the possible subjects of regulation into two classes: 1) sub-
jects national in character, which required uniform rules of regulation and were exclusively under
Congress' power, and 2) subjects local in character, which required diversity of regulation and
were concurrently under the power of the states and the federal government. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at
319. See P. HARTMAN, supra, at 24-25. The Court first applied the Cooley doctrine to a tax
situation in 1867 in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 42 (1867). The Crandall Court
struck down a state tax levied on railroad and stagecoach companies' passengers, reasoning that
the tax fell on interstate commerce. Id at 44-49. The Court also applied the Cooley doctrine to
strike down taxes in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887), and Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885).
From the 1880s to the 1930s the framework for analyzing commerce clause challenges evolved
into two unclear lines of cases from Cooley's distinction between exclusive and concurrent power.
The Court, relying either implicitly or explicitly on the Cooley doctrine, consistently immunized
interstate commerce from state taxation because the power of Congress over taxation was exclu-
sive. See Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9 (1933); Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S.
245, 252 (1929); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 562 (1925); Kansas City, F. S. &
M. Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227,231 (1916); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27,37 (1902); Brennan v.
Titusville, 153 U.S. 289, 308 (1894); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 58-59 (1891); Leloup v.
Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489,
497 (1887). The Court also looked to the Cooley distinction when resolving challenges to state
regulations. Courts invalidated regulations imposed on subjects national in character, but vali-
dated those on subjects local in character. See, e.g., California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113
(1941); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399-400 (1913); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108-09
(1890). The Cooley concurrent power doctrine thus applied to regulatory measures while the ex-
clusive power doctrine applied to tax measures. This dual standard allowed states to restrict com-
merce more by regulation under the police power than by the taxing power. See P. HARTMAN,
supra, at 31. For a more thorough explanation of these matters, see id at 23-31.
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cial analysis in state tax challenges originated in cases challenging state
regulations. 20 Despite this similarity of origin, the analytical frame-
work for determining the constitutionality of state taxes developed sep-
arately from the framework for state regulation challenges. Two
distinct but related lines of cases developed: state tax cases2' and state
regulation cases. 22  The ultimate question in both lines of cases is
20. See note 19 supra.
21. See notes 26-85 infra and accompanying text.
22. Courts resolving commerce clause challenges of state regulations look to whether the
regulation discriminates against interstate commerce or unduly burdens interstate commerce. A
state may not single out nonresidents and place them at a disadvantage to residents solely because
of nonresident status. Facial discrimination is a ground for automatic invalidation. In Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), a New Jersey statute prohibited importation of garbage
for disposal. Id at 618-19. The Supreme Court invalidated the state regulation without deter-
mining New Jersey's ultimate purpose in enacting the statute. Id at 626-27. When a state's legis-
lative objectives are credibly advanced and no patent discrimination against interstate commerce
exists, the Court applies a more flexible balancing test:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted, as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 624 (citations omitted).
In contrast to facial discrimination, underlying discrimination is a more difficult issue to re-
solve. For cases discussing the discrimination issue, see Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver-
tising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 425 U.S. 366 (1976);
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
If a regulation creates an undue burden on interstate commerce, a court may invalidate it. For
cases discussing burdens on interstate commerce, see Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S.
520 (1959); H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511 (1935). A burden, however, does not necessarily constitute a constitutional infirmity.
See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 144
(citing Stem, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce andDue Process, 4 VAND. L. REV. 446, 451
(1951)). If a court does find a burden, then it must ask whether there is an undue, and thus
impermissible, burden on interstate commerce. See Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 169.
A state may justify a burdensome state regulation if the action protects a legitimate state inter-
est. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prod., 306
U.S. 346 (1939); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUnONAL LAW 343-44 (9th ed.
1975); Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 144-45. Whether a state imposed burden on interstate com-
merce is justified by a legitimate state interest is determined by balancing the federal and state
interests involved. The judiciary has the task of balancing the competing interests to determine
the constitutionality of the state regulation. See L. TamE, supra note 18, at 340 & n.2; Van
Baalen, supra note 17, at 161; Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce
Clause, 87 HAgv. L. REy. 1762, 1774 n.72 (1974).
One significant factor a court must consider is the state's purpose for its exercise of power. If
the purpose of the regulation is improper, then the court will strike down the regulation as repug-
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whether the challenged state action discriminates against or unduly
burdens interstate commerce.' Consequently, the two lines of cases
overlap.24 Courts faced with a decision concerning one line of cases,
therefore, often relied on precedent from the other.25
B. The State Tax Line of Cases
The analytical framework for state tax challenges differs subtly from
that used in state regulation analysis. Despite the similarity of the gen-
eral issues raised in the two types of cases, courts resolve state tax chal-
lenges by relying predominantly on state tax cases.26
I, The Changing Interpretations of the States' Power to Tax
Interstate Commerce
The Supreme Court's approach to commerce clause challenges of
nant to the commerce clause. Courts grant great weight to regulations purporting a legitimate
state interest. See L. TRmE, supra note 18, at 340-42. Promoting or protecting the interests of
health, safety or the environment have the most weight, usually tipping the balance toward up-
holding the regulation. See Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 155-69; Note, supra, at 1773. Courts
recognize promotion of the economic interests of the state as a legitimate state interest. Economic
interests, however, do not have as much weight as other legitimate state interests. See L. TRIBE,
supra, at 340 & n.2; Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 161; Note, supra, at 1774 n.72.
Finding a legitimate state interest underlying a regulation does not necessarily end the inquiry
into the state's purpose. Often a regulation may have both a legitimate purpose and an illegiti-
mate or improper purpose. The law is unclear as to what the courts should do upon finding a
regulation with both a legitimate and illegitimate purpose. When the challenger of a tax can
demonstrate a less burdensome alternative for achieving the state's goal, a reasonable approach
for the court is to factor the knowledge of the existence of a less burdensome alternative into the
balancing process.
23. Compare Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 276-81 (1978) (burden issue in a state
tax case) and id at 277 n.12 (discrimination issue in a state tax case) with Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (burden issue in a state regulation case) andid (discrimination issue
in state regulation case). See generally Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 145.
24. The cases also overlap because taxes can operate as regulations. See Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 365 (1819);
National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Hefferman, 454 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D. Conn. 1978). The
general commerce clause framework for analyzing state regulations sheds light on the more spe-
cific framework developed in the state tax line of cases.
25. The following regulation challenges cite state tax cases: Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U S. 617 (1978); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424
U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The following tax challenges cite
state regulation cases: Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); Evansville
Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily,
373 U.S. 64 (1963); Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
26. See notes 27-85 infra and accompanying text.
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state taxes has shifted numerous times, spawning much confusion.
27
For over a hundred years the Court interpreted the commerce clause asimmunizing interstate activities from state taxation.28 The Court reaf-
firmed taxation immunity for activities involved in interstate commerce
as late as 1946 in Freeman v. Hewit.29 In Freeman Justice Frankfurter
explained that a state may not exercise its power in a manner that im-
pedes the free flow of trade between states. 0 Justice Frankfurter stated
that this proscription applies regardless of whether the state subjects
local commerce to the same encumbrance.31 He concluded that the
27. "[The Supreme] Court alone has handed down some three hundred full-dress opinions
spread through slightly more than that number of our reports. As was said in Miller Bros. Co. v.
Maryland, 347, U.S. 340, 344 (1954), the decisions have been 'not always clear ... consistent or
reconcilable."' Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58
(1959).
28. The immunity concept began with Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827),
and ended with Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). See
notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text; notes 35-44 infra and accompanying text. The extent of
the immunity varied significantly during this period. Brown declared that all state taxation of
interstate activity was impermissible. As states began needing more revenue, the Court discarded
the rigid, formalistic approach that disallowed state taxation of interstate commerce and instead
adopted the direct-indirect test for determining the constitutionality of a particular state tax. See
Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-'Direct Burdens," "Mullle Burdens," or What
Have You, 4 VAND. L. Rav. 496, 497-506 (1951); Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Business:
A More Liberal Trend, 35 U. LA. L. REv. 304, 306 (1975). See generally P. HA RTMAN, supra note
19, at 28-33. The direct-indirect approach permitted state taxes indirectly affecting or burdening
interstate commerce but invalidated state taxes directly imposing a burden on interstate com-
merce. See id at 28-29. Compare Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (invalidating
a state tax imposed directly on interstate commerce) with Postal Tel-Cable Co. v. City of Rich-
mond, 249 U.S. 252, 261 (1919) (validating a local tax on an intrastate aspect of a company doing
both interstate and intrastate business). In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250 (1938), the force of the immunity doctrine decreased significantly because the Court permitted
a fairly apportioned tax on interstate commerce to stand. The Court, however, shifted back to the
direct-indirect test in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). See notes 29-33 infra and accompa-
nying text. For further discussion of the early development of state tax analysis under the com-
merce clause, see P. HARTmAN, supra note 19, at 21-48; Comment, State Taxation of Interstate
Busne.s: An End To The Pivilege Tax Immuniy, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 752, 753-54 (1977).
29. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
30. Id at 252.
31. Id at 254. One commentator wrote as follows:
The infirmity of the tax, according to Freeman, was simply the "direct" bearing and
"incidence" of the tax on interstate commerce alone .... Freeman resurrected the ju-
dicially declared doctrine that the commerce clause "created an area of trade free from
interference by the States," and that it "is immaterial that local commerce is subjected to
a similar encumbrance."
P. HARTmAN, FEDERAL LmITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 78 (1981) (footnotes
omitted).
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commerce clause prohibits a direct tax on interstate commerce.32
Under this approach, states could tax activities indirectly involved in
interstate commerce, but could not tax activities directly involved in
interstate commerce.33
Analysis shows that the formalistic direct-indirect distinction is un-
satisfactory as a means to determine which activities a state may tax.
Assume two corporations engaging in the same line of business com-
pete even though one may be involved strictly in intrastate commerce
while the other is directly involved in interstate commerce. The Free-
man direct-indirect approach prevents the state from taxing the inter-
state business. Thus local business, forced to shoulder an additional
tax burden, competes at a disadvantage relative to its tax-immune
competitor.34
In contrast to the direct-indirect test, the Court has also supported
the proposition that interstate commerce must pay its way.35 Under
this approach, the state may tax interstate commerce if the tax is levied
on activities transacted within the taxing state. 36 Adhering to this view,
the Supreme Court in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Min-
nesota37 significantly reduced the tax-immune status of interstate com-
merce.38  The Northwestern Court upheld a state net income tax that
was properly apportioned39 to the local activities of a foreign corpora-
32. 329 U.S. at 256-57.
33. See general)' P. HARTMAN, supra note 31, at 76-8 1.
34. See P. H .RTMAN, supra note 19, at 33.
35. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); New Jersey Bell TeL
Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338, 351 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Di Santo v. Penn-
sylvania, 273 U.S. 34,43 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). Although these cases were decided before
Freeman, they are cited merely to contrast differing approaches to commerce clause interpreta-
tions. These differing approaches shifted with various Courts. See P. HRTmAN, supra note 19, at
41-48.
36. Justice Stone explainedi "It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those
engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases
the cost of doing the business." Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254
1938), quoted in P. HARTMAN, supra note 31, at 66.
37. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
38. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 246-49.
39. Apportionment refers to the method in which states divide a multi-state business' tax
base by formula. Seeid at 397 n.9. For discussion of apportionment, see Conlon, The Apportion-
ment of Multi-State Business Income" The NCCUSL Division of Income Act, 12 TAX ExEcuTWE
220 (1960); Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax 4pportionment andthe Circumscriotion of
the Unitary Business, 21 NAV'L TAx J. 487 (1968); Silverstein, Problems of.4pportionment in Taxa-
tion of Multistate Business, 4 TAx L. REv. 207 (1949).
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tion engaged in interstate commerce.40 After Northwestern, interstate
activity was no longer immune from state taxation merely because of
involvement in interstate commerce. Permitting apportioned taxes on
interstate businesses destroyed the citadel of tax immunity for interstate
businesses.41
The Northwestern Court, while upholding a net income tax on inter-
state commerce, also reaffirmed an earlier decision that prohibited a
state from levying a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate com-
merce.42 Although the Northwestern decision indicated that interstate
commerce was clearly taxable in some situations, exactly what aspects
of interstate commerce were taxable was left unresolved.43 After North-
western, the constitutionality of such taxes often depended on tenuous
distinctions, such as the label the state attached to the tax. If the legis-
lative draftsmen gave a proper label to the tax, then the state could levy
on the interstate activity. 4
In Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor45 the Supreme Court
heard a challenge to a state tax on the privilege of doing business in the
taxing state.' Connecticut measured the tax by the net income allo-
40. 358 U.S. at 452. Before validating the tax, the Court required the state to show that the
tax was nondiscriminatory and that a nexus between the taxed activity and the taxing state existed.
41. See Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Business- An End To The Privilege Tax Immu-
nity supra note 28, at 755-56. As courts made interstate business pay its own way, apportionment
"became one of the keys to validation of State taxes." J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 19, at 243.
42. 358 U.S. at 458. The Northwestern Court reaffirmed Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). See notes 45-58 infra and accompanying text.
43. See Hellerstein, State Taxation And The Supreme Court: Toward A More Un#Fed Ap-
proach To ConstitutionalAdjudication?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1426, 1442-43 (1977); Hellerstein, State
Taxation Under The Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335, 338
(1976).
44. In Colonial Pipeline, Inc. v. Triangle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975), the Court upheld a state tax on
the privilege of doing business in corporate form. The Court distinguished this tax from the for-
bidden levy on the privilege of doing business which had previously been disallowed by a Louisi-
ana State court. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mouton, 228 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 1969). The United
States Supreme Court permitted the Louisiana legislature, by changing a few words in the statute,
to levy the tax on the privilege of doing business in corporate form. Dissatisfied with the Court's
distinction between doing business and doing business in corporate form, Justice Blackmun de-
scribed the Court's analysis as "taxation by semantics." Id at 115 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See notes 122-25 infra and accompanying text.
45. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
46. The state imposed the tax on the privilege of doing business within the state. 340 U.S. at
603. Connecticut attempted to tax a trucking corporation engaged exclusively in interstate com-
merce. Id The statute and amendments in question are CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 418c (Cum. Supp.
1935), CoNN. Gmq. STAT. § 354e (Cum. Supp. 1939), and CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1896-1921 (1949).
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cated to the state, a method very similar to that used in Northwestern.'
The Spector Court, however, held that the commerce clause precludes
states from taxing the privilege of engaging in an exclusively interstate
business, even if the tax is fairly apportioned.48 The distinction engen-
dered in Spector is best demonstrated by the 1954 case of Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. Virginia49 (Railway 1) and the 1959 case of Railway
Express Agency, Inc. x Virginia (Railway I)." 0 Plaintiffs in Railway I
challenged a Virginia annual license tax upon gross receipts5' earned in
the state by an interstate business. The Court struck down the tax,
which was expressly levied on the privilege of doing business in the
state.52 The Virginia legislature then redrafted the statute, eliminating
the word privilege, but in all other respects retaining the same taxing
measure.53 In Railway II the United States Supreme Court, asserting
that legislative draftsmanship can determine constitutionality,54 upheld
the reworded statute even though its practical effect was the same as the
tax in Railway L" The Supreme Court finally rejected this line of
reasoning in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady6 by overruling
47. Northwestern involved a Minnesota tax levied "on that portion of a foreign corporation's
net income earned from and fairly apportioned to business activities within the taxing State when
those activities are exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce." 358 U.S. at 452.
48. 340 U.S. at 609. "The constitutional infirmity of [a state tax upon the privilege of carry-
mng on a business exclusively interstate in character] persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned
to business done within the state." Id (citations omitted).
49, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
50. 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
5 1. A gross receipts tax, in contrast to a tax on the net earnings of a business, is levied on the
entire earnings of a business without any deductions. Accord, BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIoNARY
537 (3d ed. 1969).
52. 347 U.S. at 369. The Court stated: "[Tihe fact that its measure is gross revenue is consis-
tent with a tax on the privilege of doing a volume of business which would yield that revenue
. " The Court then noted that gross receipts are not a sound measure of a business' true
profits. Id at 367.
53. See Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Business: An End to the Privilege Tax lmmu-
nih
,
. supra note 28, at 755 n.43. Compare VA. CODE §§ 58-546 to -547 (1950) with 1956 Va. Acts
ch. 612 (codified in VA. CODE §§ 58-546 to -555) (repealed 1972).
54. "One must comprehend. . . the difference between the use of magic words or labels
validating an otherwise invalid tax and their use to disable an otherwise constitutional levy. The
latter this Court has said may sometimes be done." 358 U.S. at 441 (citations omitted).
55. The tax in Railway I was a "privilege tax" based on gross receipts; the tax in Railway 1,
which the Court upheld, was a "franchise tax" based on gross receipts. The state applied both
taxes to the same parties and measured both taxes by gross receipts. 358 U.S. at 435-36. See note
53 supra.
56. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
436 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:425
Spector. 7 The Complete Auto Court, describing Spector as merely a
trap for the unwary draftsman, emphasized that courts must analyze
the economic realities of a tax's practical effect in order to determine its
constitutionality. 8
2. The Complete Auto Framework
Complete Auto set down a four-part test that a state tax must satisfy
to withstand a commerce clause challenge. 9 The Complete Auto
Court, in a unanimous decision, explained that a state tax does not of-
fend the commerce clause if it "[1] is applied to an activity with a sub-
stantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to
services provided by the State."60 State tax challenges subsequent to
Complete Auto have followed and supported this four-step analysis.61
Courts and commentators have frequently addressed the first three of
these four tests.62 Whether a business has a nexus with the taxing state
is a due process question. A state cannot levy a tax on a business unless
that business carries on some activity within the taxing state. 3 In addi-
57. Id at 288-89.
58. Id at 284-89. The Court explained:
There was no real economic difference between the statutes in Railway I and Railway
I1. The Court long since had recognized that interstate commerce may be made to pay
its way. Yet under the Spector rule, the economic realities in Railway I became irrele-
vant. The Spector rule had come to operate only as a rule of draftsmanship, and served
only to distract the courts and parties from their inquiry into whether the challenged tax
produced results forbidden by the Commerce Clause.
Id at 284-85. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, concluded that "[t]here is no economic
consequence that follows necessarily from the use of the particular words, 'privilege of doing
business,' and a focus on that formalism merely obscures the question whether a tax produces a
forbidden effect." Id at 288.
59. For discussion of Complete Auto, see Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Business.: An
Endto the Privilege Tax Inmuni, supra note 28; 19 B.C.L. REv. 312 (1978); 7 CAPITAL U.L. REV.
143 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 72-83 (1977).
60. 430 U.S. at 279.
61. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 227-28 (1980); Mo-
bil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980).
62. See notes 63-67 infra and accompanying text.
63. Quite simply, "[t]he requisite 'nexus' is supplied if the corporation avails itself of the
'substantial privilege of carrying on business' within the State .... ." Mobile Oil Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 436-37 (citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45
(1940)). The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that a state tax have a
"minimal connection" or "nexus" with the interstate activities and the taxing state. Exxon Corp.
v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 219-20. For a discussion of the nexus requirement, see
28 DEPAur. L. Rav. 205, 211-16 (1978).
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tion, a state must fairly apportion its tax. An apportionment formula
estimates how much of a corporation's earnings are derived from doing
business in the taxing state. The state thus taxes the percentage of a
corporation's total income that results from doing business in that
state.' A tax is fairly apportioned if the formula roughly approximates
the amount of the taxpayer's business income that is properly attributa-
ble to the taxing state.65 Under the discrimination part of the test, like
the discrimination analysis found in the state regulation cases, 66 a state
may not place nonresidents at a disadvantage in relation to residents
merely because of nonresident status.67 The fourth criterion-that a
tax must bear a fair relation to the services provided-- 6 8 has not re-
ceived as much judicial attention as the other three prongs of the Com-
plete Auto test.
3. The Fairly Related Requirement
Although interstate commerce must pay its own way, a state's levy
must reasonably approximate the taxed activity's cost to the state.69
64. A fairly apportioned tax has a rational relationship between the income attributed to the
state and the intrastate values of the enterprise. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue,
447 U.S. 207, 217-20 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37
(1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). A state may not levy a tax that is "out of all
appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the [taxed party] in that State." Hans Rees'
Sons v. North Carolina ex re. Maxwell 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931). For further discussion of tax
apportionment, see Cox, The NCCUSL Unform Apportionment Formula, 42 TAXES 530 (1964);
Goldstein, Allocation of Income for Purposes of Corporate Taxation, 1 TAX L. REv. 149 (1946);
Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REv. 21
(1959); Hellerstein, supra note 39.
65. See note 64 supra.
66. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72-75 (1963); note 22
supra and accompanying text. In reaching its decision whether the tax discriminated against in-
terstate commerce, the Halliburton Court relied on various state regulation cases. 373 U.S. at 72-
75. The Supreme Court has recently invalidated a state tax on discrimination grounds. Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 753-60 (1981). In Maryland the Court explained that "[olne of the
fundamental principles of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that no State, consistent with the
Commerce Clause, may 'impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce ... by
providing a direct commercial advantage to local business."' 451 U.S. at 754 (citing Northwest-
em States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)). See generally Heller-
stein, State Tax Discrimination Against Out-of-Staters, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1977).
67. See note 66 supra.
68. See note 60 supra and accompanying text; notes 69-79 infra and accompanying text.
69. Accord, Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978). See Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
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The tax, however, must not be a gross overreaching. 70 Analysis of a
tax's relation to services is usually couched in due process terms. 71
Courts typically separate due process and commerce clause issues in
tax cases.72 Due process analysis focuses on the nexus requirement.
Once the Supreme Court finds a nexus, the due process analysis is
nearly completed. In recent cases, the Court has finished the due pro-
cess analysis by resolving the "fairly related" question without criti-
cally examining the issue.73
Prior to Commonwealth Edison, courts had clearly established that
resolution of a fairly related issue necessitates a factual inquiry.74 In
70. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317,326 (1968); Great Northern Ry.
Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 151 (1936).
71. The due process clause requires that a taxpayer's 'Income attributed to the State for tax
purposes... be rationally related to 'values connected with the taxing state."' Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1980) (citing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317,
325 (1968). Accord, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980) (cita-
tions omitted).
72. In Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980), for example, the
Court analyzed the due process issues in section 11 of the opinion, id at 219-27, and the commerce
clause issues in section El of the opinion, id at 227-30. Cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-49 (due process discussed in section II of the Court's opinion while the
commerce clause is discussed in section III). In contrast, Justice Marshall in Commonwealth
Edison mixed these two constitutional concepts together. 101 S.Ct. at 2956-57.
73. In Japan Lines, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the Court responded
to the fairly related requirement with only the following: "The tax ... is 'fairly related to the
services provided by' California, services that include not only police and fire protection, but the
benefits of a trained work force and the advantages of a civilized society." Id at 445. In a state
tax challenge a year before Japan Lines, the Court stated that the challenger proved no facts
suggesting that the tax was not fairly related to services and protection provided by this state.
Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750-51 (1978).
The Court's statement implied that a factual record is needed to determine the fairly related issue.
Until Commonwealth Edison, Supreme Court decisions following Complete Auto had not critically
analyzed the fairly related question because it was not at issue in those cases. In two recent cases
the Supreme Court, for example, devoted less time to the fairly related question than it did in
Japan Lines. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). Exxon merely deferred to Japan Lines'
response to the matter. 447 U.S. at 228.
74. See Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (factual inquiry into
use and service charge on airline passengers using the airport); Capital Greyhound Lines v. Brice,
339 U.S. 542 (1950) (factual inquiry into excessiveness of Maryland tax on all common carriers
transporting passengers over Maryland roads); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939) (fac-
tual inquiry into California fee on commercially caravaning cars into the state); Dixie Ohio Ex-
press Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72 (1939) (factual inquiry into the excessiveness of a
Georgia maintenance tax on interstate commerce); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937) (factual
inquiry into California fee on commercially caravaning cars into the state).
In addition to highway and public facility taxes, courts have considered the amount of the tax in
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Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc. ,5 for example, the Supreme
Court addressed the fairly related question in detail. The Court looked
at a full factual record to determine the constitutionality of a state
"user" tax levied on an airport's passengers.76  After examining the
facts, the Court held that the tax was a reasonable estimate of the pub-
lic expenditure.77
Recently, however, states have justified their taxes by asserting that
the tax is for the privilege of doing business in a civilized society.7" A
state using this argument purports to tax for providing police and fire
protection, the benefits of a trained workforce, and other advantages of
a civilized society. Prior to Commonwealth Edison, the Supreme Court,
treating the argument as talismanic, ended the fairly related inquiry
once the state asserted the civilized society argument.79
4. Complete Auto and Other State Tax Doctrine
Although Complete Auto synthesized miscellaneous state tax doc-
trines into a workable checklist, the four tests did not incorporate all
determining the constitutionality of certain capital stock franchise taxes. Professor Hartman has
stated:
There are a few types of exactions where the Court has considered the amount of the
tax as a factor in resolving the constitutional issue. In a number of capital stock
franchise taxes, the amount of the tax has been a "material factor" in determining the
constitutionality of the tax, both on commerce and due process clause grounds.
P. HARTMAN, supra note 31, at 31 (footnote omitted).
75. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
76. Id at 716-17. As the Court in Evansville stated:
Thus, while state or local tolls must reflect a 'uniform, fair and practical standard'
relating to public expenditures, it is the amount of the tax, not its formula, that is of
central concern. At least so long as the toll is based on some fair approximation of use or
privilegefor use, as was that before us in Capital Greyhound, [399 U.S. 542 (1950)]. . . it
will pass constitutional muster ....
405 U.S. at 716-17 (emphasis added).
77. 405 U.S. at 720.
The Court's application of this "governmental benefits" test in the Evansville case indi-
cates that it will assess the facts to determine whether a state use tax upon air carriers is
excessive in relation to the benefits conferred. Because of the similarity between this
governmental benefits test and the fair relationship test enunciated in CompleteAuto and
because of the essential similarity between a use tax for the use of facilities provided by
the state and a privilege tax for the privilege of using the facilities, the same type of
factual inquiry probably will be extended in future cases to the Court's evaluation of
state taxes on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
19 B.C.L. REv. 312, 324 (1978) (footnote omitted).
78. See note 73 supra.
79. See id The Commonwealth Edison majority, although discussing the fairly related ques-
tion in more depth than past cases, was nevertheless unduly influenced by talismanic labels. See
notes 122-25 infra and accompanying text.
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state tax doctrines relevant to determining constitutionality. The long-
established multiple burden doctrine,80 although a corollary of the
Complete Auto apportionment requirement, is not specifically included
in the Complete Auto tests."1 Under the multiple burden doctrine, a
state tax is invalid if it subjects interstate commerce to multiple incon-
sistent taxes not borne by local commerce. Two cases decided after
Complete Auto dealt extensively with the multiple burden doctrine. 2
The Supreme Court has subjected the field of state taxation to many
different doctrinal approaches.8 3 A significant and current Supreme
Court trend is to look at the practical effect of a challenged state tax,
rather than to determine constitutionality on the basis of the label a
state may give to the tax."4 In Commonwealth Edison, however, the
80. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 242-44; P. HARTMAN, supra
note 19, at 33-40. See also Barrett, supra note 28. The Hellersteins explained the multiple tax
doctrine in their textbook:
[Justice Stone] swept away the traditional view that under the Commerce Clause "inter-
state commerce may not be taxed at all" and that the Commerce Clause created an area
of trade free of State taxation. In its place, he erected the multiple taxation doctrine,
under which interstate businesses were no longer immune from tax merely because the
levy was imposed on interstate commerce or on the receipts from the commerce. Instead,
such levies would be invalidated only if the Court thought that they subjected interstate
commerce to a risk of multiple taxation not borne by local commerce.
J. HELLERSTErN & W. HELLERsTEiN, supra note 19, at 243 (citations omitted). Multiple inconsis-
tent taxation may cause unconstitutional multiple burdens on interstate commerce.
81. Although the multiple burden doctrine is related to the apportionment prong of the Com-
plete Auto test, analysis of this doctrine is distinct from analysis used to ascertain the validity of
apportionment formulae. See notes 64-65 and accompanying text. Compare Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,271-75 (1978) (apportionment formula discussion) with Exxon Corp. v. Wis-
consin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1980) (multiple burden doctrine discussion).
In addition, Professor Hartman has explained that in Japan Lines, Ltd. v. County of Los Ange-
les, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the Court considered two additional constitutional matters after going
through Complete Auto's four steps. First, whether the state's tax, notwithstanding its apportion-
ment, created a substantial risk of international tax multiplication, 441 U.S. at 446, 451, and,
second, whether the tax prevented the federal government from "'speaking with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments."' Id at 451. P. HARTMAN, supra note
31, at 96 (quoting 441 U.S. at 448, 451).
82. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. at 228-29; Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 443-46. These two cases do not clarify exactly when the
Supreme Court will apply the multiple burden doctrine in the future.
83. See notes 11 & 27-51 supra and accompanying text.
84. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981) ("[a] state tax must be assessed in
light of its actual effect considered in conjunction with other provisions of a State's tax scheme");
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 227-28 (1980) (the Court is to examine
the "practical effect" of a tax in determining constitutionality under the commerce clause); De-
partment of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. at 750 (constitutionality
of a state tax under the commerce clause "depends upon the practical effect of the exaction");
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 281 (the Court has "moved toward a standard
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Court retreated from this approach.85
III. COMMONWEALTH EDISON
A. The Majority's Approach
After deciding that Montana's Coal Severance Tax 6 was subject to
commerce clause scrutiny, 7 the Commonwealth Edison Court held that
of permissibility of state taxation based upon actual effect [of the tax] rather than its legal
terminology").
85. Except for Commonwealth Edison, the Supreme Court, by overruling several cases re-
cently, has manifested its willingness to scrutinize the practical effect of a tax. See Department of
Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. at 750 (overruling Joseph v. Carter &
Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
302 U.S. 90 (1937)); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,288-89 (1977) (overruling
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423
U.S. 276, 279 (1976) (overruling Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872)). See generally Hel-
lerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Ungfed Approach To Constitu-
tional.Adjudication?, supra note 43, at 1427, 1451-52 (1977). See also note 106 infra.
86. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
87. 101 S.Ct. 2946, 2953 (1981). Three leading cases, decided over fifty years ago, set down a
long-followed precedent: severance taxes are levied on a local activity and thus are out of reach of
the commerce clause power. See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284, 285-288 & n.*
(1927) (upholding a West Virginia privilege tax measured on the gross proceeds of specified natu-
ral resources mined or produced within the state, "regardless of the place of sale or the fact that
deliveries may be made to points outside the State"); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S.
172, 176-79 (1923) (holding a Minnesota occupation tax measured by a percentage of the value of
iron ore mined or produced is not a tax on interstate commerce even when the ore is continuously
shipped to other states immediately after it is mined); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S.
245, 260-61 (1922) (upholding a Pennsylvania ad valorem tax on anthracite coal prepared for
market, even when the coal is to be exported to other states). Rejecting a commerce clause chal-
lenge to the severance tax in Heisler, the court reasoned that mining is not subject to commerce
clause restraints because mining is a local activity and not "in" interstate commerce. 260 U.S. at
258-61. Within five years of Heisler, the United States Supreme Court held similar taxes valid by
applying the mechanical distinction used in Heiler that if an activity is not in interstate commerce
at the time the state tax is levied, then the state's taxing right is not limited by the commerce
clause. For a discussion of Heisler, its progeny and its faults, see Hellerstein, Constitutional Con-
straints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 245, 247-48 (1978).
leisler's rationale was consistant with the commerce clause framework that had developed at
the time of the decision. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), set out the
now-discredited local activity-national activity distinction, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319-21. Under
this commerce clause fiat, activities national in nature are subject to Congressional or dormant
commerce clause power. If the activity, however, is local in nature, the state has exclusive power
over the activity. Id The Court, attempting to reach intrastate activities, formulated the "current
of commerce" theory in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). Swift intimated that
local activities are subject to commerce clause constraints if they are "in" commerce or are an
integral part of the "current of commerce." 196 U.S. at 398-99. The Heisler rationale paralleled
Swit's mechanical distinction between activities "in" commerce and those not yet "in" commerce.
In 1937, however, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
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the tax was not repugnant to the commerce clause8 8 In upholding the
constitutionality of the tax, Justice Marshall focused on the four-part
Complete Auto test.89 The significant issues in Commonwealth Edison
involved Complete Auto's third prong, the proscription of discrimina-
tory taxes,90 and fourth prong, the fairly related requirement. 91
The appellants asserted that because ninety percent92 of Montana's
coal is shipped to other states, the ultimate burden of the tax was
shifted to consumers in those states.93 The tax, then, as a practical mat-
ter, operated as a discriminatory burden on non-Montana citizens.94
Justice Marshall disagreed and distinguished the Montana tax from
those cases involving facial discrimination. 95 He explained that the tax
did not discriminate because Montana taxed the amount of coal mined,
without any distinction regarding in-state and out-of-state consumers. 96
(1937), shifted the emphasis of commerce clause inquiries from a stream of commerce approach to
an approach analyzing the effect of the activity on commerce. If a state action has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, a court should apply commerce clause analysis to determine consti-
tutionality. 301 U.S. at 37. This approach greatly expanded the reach of the commerce clause
into intrastate activities. The substantially affecting test, see 301 U.S. at 31-32, is the modem test
for determining the applicability of commerce clause restraints and makes any activity that sub-
stantially affects commerce subject to commerce clause scrutiny. See note 18 supra and accompa-
nying text.
In Commonwealth Edson the appellee, Montana, argued that Heisler and its progeny precluded
the severance tax from commerce clause scrutiny. See Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 6-12, 101 S.Ct.
2946 (1981). The Commonwealth Edson Court, recognizing that the "affecting commerce" test
was the appropriate approach, declared that state "taxes levied on a 'local' activity preceding entry
of the goods into interstate commerce may substantially affect interstate commerce, and this effect
is the proper focus of Commerce Clause inquiry." 101 S. Ct. at 2953.
88. 101 S. Ct. at 2960.
89. 101 S. Ct. at 2953.
90. See id at 2954-55; notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
91. 101 S. Ct. at 2955-60; notes 68-79 supra and accompanying text.
92. 101 S. Ct. at 2954. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, noted that allegedly as much as 90% of
Montana's mined coal "is exported to other states pursuant to long-term purchase contracts with
out-of-state utilities." Id at 2965 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. See Jurisdictional Statement at 13, 21-22, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). Appellants argued that
the tax "was designed to shift billions of dollars to Montana directly from the citizens of [other]
states by the end of the century ...... " Id at 13.
94. Id at 21-22.
95. 101 S. Ct. at 2954.
96. Id Justice Marshall looked only for overt, facial discrimination. Only a few weeks
before deciding Commonwealth Edson, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n each case it is our
duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical
operation work discrimination against interstate commerce." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 756 (1981) (quoting Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1940)). See note 22 supra;
notes 105-11 infra and accompanying text.
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Appellants also claimed that Montana's severance tax was not fairly
related to the services provided by the state, as required by the fourth
part of the Complete Auto test.97 They specifically argued that the trial
court should have granted them an opportunity to establish a full fac-
tual record to show that the tax was not fairly related to Montana's
additional costs incurred because of coal mining.98 By rejecting this
contention the majority in essence held that a taxing state, whose tax
satisfies the first three Complete Auto prongs, may tax interstate com-
merce at any rate it so chooses, unrestricted by the commerce clause.99
Justice Marshall explained that a general revenue tax,10° such as the
Montana tax in question, was not a means of reimbursement for the
specific benefits the state has provided.1"' Unlike user taxes, 10 2 a tax
imposed for the overall support of the state government helps defray
the costs of general, rather than specific, benefits the state provides,
such as police and fire protection, a trained work force, and the advan-
tages of a civilized society.' 0 3 Under the majority's approach, the rate
of a tax on interstate commerce is thus not subject to judicial scrutiny if
97. 101 S. Ct. at 2955.
98. Id Jurisdictional Statement at 20-21, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981); Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 14-17, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
99. "The simple fact is that the appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for
legislative, and not judicial, resolution." 101 S. Ct. at 2959.
100. Taxes are either general, that is, imposed for the raising of a revenue for the support of
the government and for public purposes generally, or they are special or local, that is, for the
benefit of a specific governmental function. 27 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW 581 (2d ed. D. Garland & L. McGehee eds. 1904). Accord, BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 617
(5th ed. 1979).
101. Justice Marshall noted the following:
[T]he linchpin of appellants' contention is the incorrect assumption that the amount of
state taxes that may be levied on an activity connected to interstate commerce is limited
by the costs incurred by the State on account of that activity. Only then does it make
sense to advocate judicial examination of the relationship between taxes paid and bene-
fits provided. But as we have previously noted, see supra, at 2957, interstate commerce
may be required to contribute to the cost of providing all governmental services, includ-
ing those services from which it arguably receives no direct "benefit." In such circum-
stances, absent an equal protection challenge (which appellants do not raise), and unless
a court is to second-guess legislative decisions about the amount or disposition of tax
revenues, it is difficult to see how the court is to go about comparing costs and benefits in
order to decide whether the tax burden on an activity connected to interstate commerce
is excessive.
101 S. Ct. at 2959 n.16 (emphasis in original).
102. Justice Marshall distinguished, without in-depth analysis, the line of cases involving
,user" taxes on highways and public facilities. 101 S. Ct. at 2956. In this line of cases, the Court
did determine the tax's relation to benefits provided. See note 74 supra.
103. 101 S. Ct. at 2955-60.
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the taxing state satisfies the first three parts of the Complete Auto ap-
proach, deems its tax a general revenue tax, and asserts that the tax-
payer enjoyed the benefits of a civilized society.1°4
B. Analysis
In his analysis of the Complete Auto test's third prong, Justice Mar-
shall, having found no facial discrimination, declared that no discrimi-
nation existed at all. 105 This approach, however, contravenes the
Court's recent approach of looking at the practical effect of a tax.
10 6 If
the Court were really willing to look at the practical effect of the Mon-
tana tax, then it would have scrutinized for less blatant, underlying
forms of discrimination. 7
Courts are well aware that discrimination can take place in unique
ways.'0  As the dissent correctly pointed out, a state tax tailored to fall
on interstate commerce must receive careful judicial scrutiny.3 9 Ex-
amination of the Montana Coal Severance Tax legislative history
reveals a tailored tax and a taxing scheme arguably conceived with an
illegitimate purpose."10
104. Id
105. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
106. The Commonwealth Edison majority even asserted that they were to look at the practical
effects of the tax. 101 S. Ct. at 2953. In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), the Court
refused to look at an Iowa tax's practical effect, despite the wishes of Justice Powell. Id at 288-89
(Powell, J., dissenting). Moorman involved a challenge to a state apportionment formula that
differed from the type of formula used in other states. See Id at 269-71 & n.3; notes 64-65 supra
and accompanying text. Moorman is easily distinguishable from Commonwealth Edison, as the
tailored discrimination in Commonwealth Ed'son is eminently more egregious than that in the
Moorman case. Therefore, Moorman lends no support to the Commonwealth Edison majority's
untenable approach, which involved a failure to consider the practical effect of a tailored tax.
107. The Supreme Court has invalidated state actions when the practical effect of the state
action operates discriminatively. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349
(1951). In Dean Milk an ordinance on milk inspections and sales applied to the municipality's
residents and nonresidents alike. The Court nevertheless found the ordinance discriminatory and
noted that: "[ilt is immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside the Madison area is subject to the
same proscription as that moving in interstate commerce." 340 U.S. at 354 nA.
108. See, ag., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (de facto discrimination in the
operation of a hiring procedure); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (purposeful discrim-
ination in redefining city boundaries); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discrimination in
the administration of an ordinance).
109. 101 S. Ct. at 2964-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See notes 110-12 Infra and accompany-
ing text.
110. Montana recognized that the tax would shift a large burden onto nonresidents. See
Towe, supra note 10, at 4.
Most of Montana's coal is shipped out of state to power plants and utility companies in
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Heightening the level of scrutiny for a tailored tax is consistent with
the well-established doctrine that a court should carefully analyze any
state legislative action when the burden falls predominantly on nonres-
idents.11 The rationale for this doctrine is that nonresidents do not
have access to the political checks available to residents. The legisla-
tive process is the usual political check to undesirable state action. Res-
the Midwest. In reviewing the contracts between the coal companies and the utility com-
panies who purchase the coal, all of the contracts that were shown to our Legislative
Committee contain an escalation clause for taxes. In other words, the local companies
simply add the additional taxes to their bill, and the entire cost is passed on to the pur-
chasers in the Midwest or elsewhere. Because most of the purchasers are regulated util-
ity companies, it is reasonable to assume these companies will, in turn, pass on their
extra costs to their customers.
Id "[The tax revenue] is used and needed for the general operation of State Government.' Id at
1. State Senator Thomas E. Towe was Chief Sponsor of the Montana Coal Tax Law, 1975. See
Hearings, supra note 9, at 232.
Vice Chairman of the Montana House Taxation Committee, Representative Ora Halvorson
said that "[i]n the energy crunch today, Montanans should remember that the Arabs have the oil
but Montana has the coal. ... Kalispell Representative Says Coal Tax Too Low, Missoulian,
Jan. 11, 1975. Rep. Halvorson's statement suggests that a purpose of the tax was to exploit the
energy situation in the country.
One commentator believes that, as a factual matter, Montana and the other Northwestern states
possess enough of the supply of low-sulphur coal to cause the shifting effect of the burden of the
tax onto coal importers. Gillis, supra note 3, at 63. For a thorough, technical explanation of tax
exportation, see Shelton & Morgan, Resource Taxation, Tax Exportation and Regional Energy Poli-
cies, 17 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 261 (1977).
Interestingly, in 1979 Montana passed legislation providing property and income tax relief for
state residents. See MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -111 (1981). Allegedly, almost 20% of
Montana's total tax revenue comes from the severance tax. 101 S. Ct. at 2966 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981)).
Ill. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Mr. Justice Stone pro-
vided a justification for use of more rigorous judicial scrutiny in some situations. His now famous
"footnote 4" stated as follows:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation ...
Nor need we enquire.. . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted). Soon after Carolene Products, Justice Stone applied the
"footnote 4" rationale to a state taxation challenge. "Mo the extent that the burden falls on
economic interests without the state, it is not likely to be alleviated by those political restraints
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely interests within the state."
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45-46 n.2 (1940).
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idents displeased with a state regulation or tax can exercise their
political power to effect change. To assume, however, that state legisla-
tors will consider the needs of nonconstituents as well is unrealistic.
Nonresidents, consequently, have no political recourse in the taxing
state. The courts thus provide the only restraint to whatever tax bur-
dens a state may levy on nonresidents.1 1 2
Ninety percent of the Montana severance tax burden ultimately fell
on out-of-state consumers.1 3 If the Commonwealth Edison majority
had given more weight to the practical effect of the tax, the Court
would have found that by exporting the burden of the tax to nonresi-
dents, it operated as a discriminatory burden.1 1 4 Because the indicia of
tailoring were present,' 5 the Court, at a minimum, should have more.
carefully scrutinized the tax. At the least, the appropriate level of scru-
tiny mandated the development of a full factual record." 6
Despite the reasons to scrutinize the tax carefully, the majority af-
firmed the trial court decision that the tax, as a matter of law, was fairly
related to the services provided by the state.'1 7  Justice Marshall im-
112. If the political process cannot function properly, then the judiciary must be more willing
to exert its power. See note I l1 supra.
113. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
114. See note 110 supra and accompanying text. The dissent in Commonwealth Edison did
not make factual conclusions about the tax's effects. 101 S. Ct. 2946, 2966-67 & n.7 (1981). They
merely contended that the plaintiffs were entitled to an opportunity to have a trial on the merits.
Id at 2964-65.
115. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 74 supra.
117. See 101 S. Ct. at 2955-60. Justice Marshall expressed concern about the evidentiary tasks
that might ensue if the plaintiffs were allowed the opportunity to prove their factual allegations.
[l]t is doubtful whether any legal test could adequately reflect the numerous and compet-
ing economic, geographic, demographic, social, and political considerations that must
inform a decision about an acceptable rate or level of state taxation, and yet be reason-
ably capable of application in a wide variety of individual cases. But even apart from
the difficulty of the judicial undertaking, the nature of the factflnding and judgment that
would be required of the courts merely reinforces the conclusion that questions about the
appropriate level of state taxes must be resolved through the political process.
Id at 2959. Despite Justice Marshall's fears about evidentiary problems, much of the relevant
factual information was readily ascertainable. Montana moniters governmental expenses in the
coal impact areas. See generally R. Robinson, Memorandum: Coal Impact and Coal Board Grants
(Sept. 20, 1977) (from the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst to the Legislative Finance Com-
mittee) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarerly). Montana has a Coal Board which
grants funds from the severance tax to the impacted areas. Id at 6. "Grants are made by the coal
board 'to local government units and state agencies to assist local governmental units in meeting
the local impact of coal development by enabling them to adequately provide governmental serv-
ices and facilities which are needed as a direct consequence of coal development."' Id Montana
keeps meticulous records of requests and grants concerning the impacted areas. Montana's
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plied that the required relation to services provided by a state is not a
function of the specific services provided by the state to the taxpayer. I"8
The fourth prong of the test, he explained, pertains to the measure' 19
and not the rate 20 of a tax. An improper tax measure, however, would
have problems satisfying Complete Auto's first prong, the nexus re-
quirement, or the second prong, the fair apportionment requirement.
The majority, by treating any tax rate as constitutional so long as the
first three prongs of the test are met, thus rendered the fourth prong-
the fairly related requirement-meaningless.' 2  After Commonwealth
Edison, the fourth prong, despite no apparent ambiguity in its wording,
has negligible independent significance in determining the constitution-
ality of a state tax.
In several pre-Commonwealth Edison decisions the Supreme Court
looked to the practical effect of the state's tax scheme, rather than the
label applied to the tax.'22 After Commonwealth Edison, however,
records of governmental costs include, for example: school systems; water treatment, storage and
distribution; sewage collection, treatment and disposal; jail facilities; road grader, dump truck;
backhoe and sewer cleaner, patrol car, garbage truck; law clerk; replace water pipeline; pedestrian
overpass; street sweeper, motor patrol; community nurse's salary; bookmobile and library; airport
improvements; fire truck; road maintenance equipment; teacher housing; solid wastes systems im-
provements; and, expansion of the courthouse. See Cohea, Memorandum" CoalBoard Grants 40-
51 (January 11, 1978) (from Montana Legislative Council Staff Researcher to Coal Tax Oversight
Committee) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly). With such extensive records
on governmental expenditures in the coal impact areas, denying plaintiffs an opportunity to prove
that Montana's tax was not fairly related to services provided is anomalous.
Furthermore, the impact areas may not need the state's support.
[Wlith few exceptions, the impacted units have the means to finance the required ex-
penses without state support. The coal area is characterized by some of the lowest mill
levies in the state and has been blessed by mushrooming property valuations.
This analysis would indicate that the need for state supported local impact grants may
be much less than originally anticipated by the legislature.
R. Robinson, supra, at 25. Not suprisingly, several commentators have accused Montana of
"'OPEC-like revenue maximization." 101 S. Ct. at 2967 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (commentators
cited therein).
118. 101 S. Ct. at 2955-60.
119. The majority viewed the fourth prong as referring to the measure of a tax, not the rate or
amount. 101 S. Ct. at 2958. Justice Marshall, by ignoring the amount of a tax, construed its
validity as turning on whether the tax is proportional rather than fixed at a flat rate. See 101 S. Ct.
at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. Justice Marshall refused to examine the rate of the tax. 101 S. Ct. at 2959-60.
121. After Commonwealth Edison the fairly related requirement is meaningless because its
only remaining significance concerns the nexus or apportionment requirements. See 101 S. Ct. at
2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Any tax with nexus or apportionment problems, however, will
not pass muster under Complete Auto's first or second precepts. The Court will consequently
strike down a tax before reaching the fourth prong.
122. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
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courts may resolve challenges regarding the fair relation of a tax to
state services by adhering to talismanic labels. The state, after meeting
the first three prongs of the Complete Auto test, need only describe the
tax as a general revenue tax and assert that the tax is compensation to
the state for having provided the taxpayer with the benefits of a civi-
lized society. Courts presumably will not give future state tax challeng-
ers an opportunity to demonstrate that the tax, even when manifestly
disproportionate to the services provided, is not related to the benefits
provided by the taxing state.12 States with informed draftsmen can
now make any tax rate constitutional by merely giving the tax the
proper labels. As to the fairly related inquiry, Commonwealth Edison's
result is untenable. A state may now constitutionally tax at a rate of
one hundred percent, or even one thousand percent, of the value of the
taxed good. 24 Justice Blackmun, writing a cogent dissent, correctly
stated that the majority emasculated the fourth prong of the Complete
Auto test. 125
IV. A SUGGESTED COMMERCE CLAUSE FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYZING STATE ENERGY TAX CHALLENGES
A. The Actual Burden of State Taxes on Energy Resources
The burden caused by state energy taxes is not accurately reflected
by simply examining the extent to which the levy decreases the move-
ment of the taxed resource in interstate commerce.1 26 The significance
of a state's energy tax is manifested by the effect it has on the nation's
economy.127 Economic analysis reveals that state taxes on energy re-
sources affect the entire nation.
123. "[The Court implicitly ratifies Montana's contention that it is free to tax this coal at 100%
or even 1000% of value should it choose to do so." 101 S. Ct. at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's point, although well made, is hyper-
bolic because such a high "tax" would be a "taking," not a tax. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V;
amend. XIV, § 1.
125. Id Justice Marshall's approach promotes the Balkanization of the states, a result directly
contrary to the purpose of the commerce clause. See note 12 supra.
126. A burden on interstate commerce is typically revealed by showing that an interstate activ-
ity slowed down as a result of the state action. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNo, HAND-
BOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 252-56 (1978). In Commonwealth Edison, however, the exporting
of coal, the "activity," increased in Montana after the tax was imposed. See Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, - Mont.., _, 615 P.2d 847, 849-50 (1980). Despite this increase in the
taxed activity, a burden of interstate commerce arguably still existed. See notes 127-52 Infra and
accompanying text.
127. See notes 128-52 infra and accompanying text.
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Energy is vital to a developed, industrial nation.' 28 Many aspects of
modem society, such as industry,129 transportation,130 and heat,' 3 ' are
heavily dependent on energy. A state tax that directly affects the price
or allocation of an item basic to the nation's economic well being may
constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce.1 32
A tax raises the price of a good for a consumer. If a consumer con-
tinues to buy the same quantity of a taxed good, a greater percentage of
the consumer's real disposable income is spent on the taxed good and
less is available for spending on other goods and services.1 33 This re-
duction in consumption and spending occurs when an energy resource
is taxed by a state exporting a large percentage of the taxed resource.
13 4
The aggregate consumption in the nation consequently moves down-
ward as consumers pay more of their disposable income to obtain the
taxed good.' 35  This decline causes a lower equilibrium level of net
national product.3 6 In noneconomic terms, the nation is producing
and consuming at an inefficient level-at a level lower than the nation's
capacity given its quantity of capital, labor, and technology. When a
tax has this dampening effect on the economy, commerce slows
down. 37 Because less money is available for purchasing goods, move-
ment of goods in interstate commerce is reduced.
128. See generally A. AsKuN, How ENERGY AFFECTS THE ECONOMY (1978); H. BUCKNELL,
ENERGY AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE (1981); N. KANNAN, ENERGY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND
EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); H. MERKLEIN & W. HARDY, ENERGY ECONOMICS (1977);
M. SLESSER, ENERGY IN THE ECONOMY (1978); ENERGY AND SECURITY (G. Treverton ed. 1980).
See also note 1 supra.
129. See J. DARMSTADTER, J. DUNKERLY & J. ALTERMAN, supra note 1, at 101-40; N. KAN-
NAN, supra note 128, at 149-59; M. SLESSER, supra note 128, at 44-58. See also note 1 supra.
130. See J. DARMSTATER, J. DUNKERLY & J. ALTERMAN, supra note 1, at 70-100.
131. Seeid at 36-61.
132. A state tax does not necessarily impose a significant burden on the nation's commerce.
See notes 138-40 infra and accompanying text.
133. If, at this point, consumers attempt to purchase as many goods and services as they previ-
ously did, an inflationary trend develops. See notes 144-45 infra and accompanying text. If, how-
ever, the purchaser spends only within his means, a dampening occurs from the increased energy
cost. See notes 135-37 bifra and accompanying text.
134. If the state taxed a good that the state did not export on a large scale, then the tax would
produce only slight economic effects on the nation.
135. If this reduction in consumption does not occur, inflation results. See notes 144-45 infra
and accompanying text.
136. The most basic definition of net national product is the total money value of private (non-
governmental) consumption expenditures in the nation. See P. SAMUElSON, ECONOMICS 181 &
n.2 (9th ed. 1973).
137. This Note uses "economy" and "commerce" synonymously in some situations. Any ac-
tivity affecting commerce must-a fortiori--affect interstate commerce.
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The effects of a price increase in a given natural resource depend
upon the willingness and capabilities of consumers to shift to alterna-
tive resources. 138 A price increase in an elastic1 39 good results in a real-
location of consumer purchasing, whereas a change in price of an
inelastic 1" good does not produce a shift to other alternatives.
If coal is elastic, then an increase in the price of coal may cause con-
sumers to shift to oil.141 In the United States, this shift would require
increased oil imports. Because the price of imported oil has increased
significantly,1 42 higher coal costs force consumers to pay more for en-
ergy, regardless of whether they switch to oil or continue to use coal.
Consumers would then have to allocate a greater percentage of their
disposable income to energy. The result is a general dampening of the
economy.1 43 Arguably, then, a tax on an energy resource may burden
commerce if demand for the resource is elastic.
An increase in the general cost of energy leads to inflation because a
greater percentage of disposable income is then spent on energy
costs. 14  The demand for money will increase as people attempt to
purchase as many goods as they purchased before the increase in the
cost of energy. As monetary authorities increase the money supply to
meet this increased demand, the aggregate level of prices will rise. 1
45
138. For an explanation of the substitute goods concept, see P. SAMUELSON, supra note 136, at
430-31.
139. A good is elastic if the demand for the good is responsive to a change in its price. For a
more technical definition of elastic, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 80-91 (3d ed. 1972);
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 136, at 379-81.
140. If a change in price has no effect on demand for a good, its demand is inelastic. For a
more technical definition of inelastic, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 139, at 80-91; P.
SAMUELSON, supra note 136, at 379-81, 435.
141. This shift is premised on the substitutability of coal for oil.
142. See NEP II, supra note 1, at 15-21. In 1979 alone, oil prices rose over twenty percent, Zd
at 15-16.
143. See notes 133-37 supra and accompanying text. This shifting effect caused by a tax on an
elastic good also harms the efficiency of the nation's production and consumption. Anytime con-
sumers are forced to shift to more expensive alternative goods, a corresponding shift occurs away
from the optimum allocation of goods. "Insofar as a tax makes interstate commerce more expen-
sive, it tends to alter the scheme of production and trade from that which would be established by
other economic forces, reducing the output and discouraging the expansion of efficient out-of-state
producers." Developments In The LawK-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Bus-
ness, 75 HAtv. L. REv. 953, 957, 969 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
144. This behavior occurs only if consumers continue to attempt to purchase as many goods
and services as before the state imposed the tax.
145. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN II APPENDIX C: ENERGY AND
THE ECONOMY 9 (1979) (hereinafter NEP II APPENDIX C). In theory, when consumers spend a
higher percentage of disposable income on one good, the economy adjusts by forcing the price of
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A shift resulting in increased oil imports causes additional problems
of its own. Any increase in oil consumption causes more dependence
on unstable oil-exporting nations, a politically undesirable develop-
ment.' 46 Importing more oil also leads to inflation. A chain of events
produces this inflationary effect. First, increased purchases of expen-
sive imported oil raises the bill of the United States for oil imports.
This and other factors cause an excess supply of dollars in foreign ex-
change markets. The dollar in turn depreciates in value because this
increased supply is greater than demand. As the value of the dollar
decreases in foreign markets, all imports become more expensive. Pay-
ing more dollars for all imported goods then contributes to inflation.147
If coal is inelastic, the consumers will continue to purchase the same
pre-tax quantity, despite the increased Cost.148  Individuals will then
spend a greater percentage of their disposable income on energy, just as
if they had switched to oil. This necessarily leaves less real money
available for consuming other goods and services and adversely affects
the general economy. The tax on coal thus serves to lower the nation's
production and consumption and reduce the country's standard of
living. 1
49
Regardless of whether demand for an energy resource is elastic or
inelastic, a high state tax on an energy resource has serious national
economic consequences. 50 An activity that either reduces the nation's
aggregate consumption and production or contributes to inflation is
clearly a burden on commerce. Energy is vital to commerce. 151 With-
out an adequate justification, 152 state-imposed economic action that di-
other goods to decrease. As a practical matter, however, this does not always work because prices
and especially wages are "sticky" as to downward movement, When prices do not adjust down-
ward and one good is relatively more expensive, consumers do not reduce consumption and infla-
uon results.
146. See NEP II, supra note 1, at 21-22.
147. See NEP II, supra note 1, at 19-21, 158-60.
148. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
149. For a more thorough explanation of the economic effects stemming from a reduction in
consumers' real disposable income, see notes 133-37 supra and accompanying text. Another prob-
lem occurs from taxing an inelastic resource that is produced predominantly for exporting to other
states. The problem concerns the constitutionality of "tax exportation." See Developments, supra
note 143, at 968-7 1; note 110 supra.
150. See notes 141-47supra and accompanying text (elastic); notes 148-49 supra and accompa-
nying text (inelastic).
151. See note 128 supra.
152. Adequate justifications are similar to legitimate purposes. A tax, for example, that oper-
ates to reimburse the state for services provided is adequately justified.
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rectly burdens commerce is repugnant to the commerce clause.
B. 4 Proposalfor Commerce Clause Analysis
An important premise of the proposed analytical framework is that
because interstate commerce must pay its own way,153 a state may exact
a tax which reasonably estimates the state's cost in providing any re."
lated services. 154 Flowing from this premise, the proposal is simply
that courts construe any tax on a good involved in interstate commerce
as an undue burden to the extent that the amount of the levy is greater
than the cost to the taxing state.1 55 The proposal is nothing more than
a corollary of the plain language in the Complete Auto fairly related
test. To make a fairly related determination, which courts have re-
cently been reluctant to do,'5 6 would require development of a full fac-
tual record. This process is admittedly time consuming, but by no
means an impossible task. 15 7 The proposal, then, requires that courts
shoulder the task of making factual determinations regarding the cost
of the services provided by a state that taxes an energy resource taken
from within its boundaries. Because the task is large, requiring the
courts to make a factual determination in every state tax challenge case
is impractical. Energy resource taxation, however, presents a different
situation. Few matters are as important as energy to an industrial na-
tion. Because a state tax on an energy resource may have such signifi-
cant and pervasive effects on the nation,1 58 the judiciary should decide
the fairly related question on the basis of facts in situations involving
challenges to state energy taxes. In energy tax disputes, courts should
not stop the fairly related inquiry as soon as a state asserts the benefits
of a civilized society justification. 19 The amount by which an inter-
153. See, eg., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). See also note
69 supra and accompanying text.
154. See notes 60 & 69 supra and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of a cost-based approach to state taxation of energy resources, see Com-
ment, An Outline For Development of Cost-Based State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J.
913 (1980).
156. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
157. The court must determine whether the state has any reasonable basis for its judgment
that the tax is necessary to compensate the state for particular costs resulting from the taxed activ-
ity. "Mhe task is likely to prove to be a formidable one, but its difficulty does not excuse our
failure to undertake it." 101 S. Ct. at 2972 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158. See notes 1 & 128 supra and accompanying text.
159. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. The analysis proposed in this Note is
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state activity increases these costs is a finite, ascertainable amount. 160
When the amount of the tax is greater than the services provided by the
state, courts should construe the tax as an undue burden on the nation,
thus violating the commerce clause.
1 61
If a court gives substantive meaning to the fairly related issue, that
court must develop a full factual record to reveal the cost of the services
provided by the taxing state.1 62 As with many evidentiary battles, the
final outcome may depend significantly on the allocation of the bur-
dens of proof. In state tax challenges, the burden of demonstrating the
unconstitutionality of a tax rests on the challenger.'
63
In various circumstances, however, shifting the burden from one
party onto an adversary is a reasonable action for a court./64 Shifting
the burden is prudent when social and economic circumstances
change.'65 The increased significance of energy for the nation justifies
a shifting of the burden onto the taxing state.
66
limited to situations involving state taxes on energy resources when such resources are involved in
interstate commerce.
160. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
161. Thus any unjustified tax impinging on interstate commerce is invalid. The court can
reach this conclusion by balancing in the same manner as the state regulation cases involving
state-imposed burdens. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
Since Complete Auto has shifted the focus of the examination of state taxes on inter-
state commerce from a per se approach to a balancing approach, the law respecting
commerce clause limitations applicable to state tax schemes is now consistent with the
approach employed by the Court in determining the validity of state statutes regulating
interstate commerce.
19 B.C.L. Rav. 312, 325 (1978).
As to energy taxes, this Note proposes the use of some form of heightened judicial scrutiny
because of the increased significance of energy. For a discussion of the heightened scrutiny ap-
plied to state taxation of foreign commerce, see Comment, The Negative Commerce Clause-A
Strict Test For State Taxation Of Foreign Commerce: Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 135 (1980).
162. See C. Dumi.ts & L. BRowN, supra note 17, at 81-114 (describing a method for acquir-
ing a factual record); Comment, Constitutional Limitations On State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT.
R SOuRCES J. 887, 910-11 (1980) (concluding a factual record is essential in cases such as Com-
monwealth Edion). See also notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
163. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221-22 (1980) (the com-
plainant has the distinct burden of showing by "clear and cogent evidence" that it results in extra-
territorial values being taxed).
164. See C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EViDENCE 806-07 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
165. Id at 807.
166. Id In terms of the proposed analysis, this shift in the burden requires a state to show that
its tax is a reasonable estimate of the services provided to the taxed enterprise. Any amount of the
tax above the state's cost is an undue burden on interstate commerce, thus invalidating the tax.
For further discussion of a cost-based energy tax, see Comment, supra note 155.
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Another accepted reason for shifting the burden of proof is one
party's superior access to the proof.167 If a state's records and statistics
on matters relevant to a cost determination are not reasonably accessi-
ble, then a court is further justified in requiring the state to prove that
the tax reasonably estimates the cost to the state of services provided.
C. Commonwealth Edison Revisited Under the Suggested Commerce
Clause Framework
The Commonwealth Edison Court, asserting that the rate of a tax is
not a matter for the courts to analyze, t16 held, as a matter of law, that
the severance tax was fairly related to the governmental services Mon-
tana provides. 169 The Court did not permit a factual showing that the
tax was actually related to Montana's costs.
Under the suggested analytical framework, courts would not decide
the fairly related issue as a matter of law in cases involving taxes on
energy resources. A court would, at a minimum, permit the challenger
to demonstrate that the tax is not fairly related to the services pro-
vided.170 A court could go still further and force the state to justify the
amount of its tax in terms of actual costs incurred as a result of the
energy-related activity.' 7' Under the proposed approach, if the factual
record revealed that the Montana severance tax, for example, reason-
ably approximated the services provided by Montana, then the tax
would be valid. If, however, the factual examination revealed that the
amount of the tax exceeded the costs to Montana, then the tax would be
unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce.172
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF LIMITING STATE ENERGY TAXES
Commerce clause constraints are not the only way to limit the
167. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 164, at 806-07.
168. 101 S. Ct. 2946, 2952, 2960 (1981).
169. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
170. As national demand for coal increased, Montana experienced a large growth in popula-
tion in communities near the mining areas. The increased population affected local school dis-
tricts. The effects of this and other problems associated with the coal-related growth boom are
closely watched by the state. Montana has a Coal Board specially created to aid in funding coal-
impacted areas. Montana, which monitors the impact of the coal industry, has the data necessary
for determining the cost of the services provided by the state. See, e.g., Cohea, supra note 117; R.
Robinson, supra note 117, at 12.
171. See notes 164-67 supra and accompanying text.
172. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 60:425
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/7
Number 2] STATE ENERGY RESOURCE TAXATION
amount a state taxes its energy resources. Various legislative alterna-
tives are also available. The House of Representatives is currently re-
viewing a bill designed to limit state severance taxes on coal.173 The
bill mandates that state severance taxes not exceed a rate of twelve and
a half percent of the value of coal extracted in a given year for use in
any powerplant or major fuel-burning installation and prepared for
transportation in interstate commerce. 174 Congressional imposition of
this ceiling on severance taxes is unlikely to meet any serious constitu-
tional challenges. 175
173. Actually, not one but three nearly indentical bills are receiving legislative attention. Be-
cause they are in essence the same proposal, the bills are treated as "a" bill in the text of this Note.
The bills are: H.R. 6625, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6654, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); and
H R. 7163, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The proposal reads as follows:
A BILL
To further the objectives of national energy policy of conserving oil and natural gas
through removing excessive burdens on production of coal.
Be it enacted bjy the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States ofAmerica
in Congress assembled, That the Congress finds that, in order to alleviate the national
energy emergency, reduce national dependence on petroleum imports, encourage the
highest and best use of domestic petroleum and natural gas, and enhance interstate com-
merce by promoting increased reliance on our national reserves of coal for the genera-
tion of electricity and power, it is necessary to remove excessive burdens on production
of coal used in powerplants and major fuel-burning installations.
SEC. 2. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.)
is amended by adding immediately following section 807 the following new section:
"SEC. 808. COAL FOR POWERPLANT AND INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION.
"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of State or Federal law, with respect to any
coal which is destined for shipment in interstate commerce for use in any powerplant or
major fuel-burning installation, the sum of all severance taxes or fees, in respect of any
fiscal year, levied upon or collected from any taxpayer, by a State or any political subdi-
vision thereof on such coal or on any improvements or other rights, property, or assets
produced, owned, or utilized in connection with the production of such coal shall not
exceed a total of 12,1 per centum of the value of such coal produced during such fiscal
year at the time it has been extracted and prepared for transportation free on board the
production site, exclusive of all State and local taxes and fees.
"(b) For purposes of subsection (a), 'severance taxes or fees' include any tax or fee, by
whatever name called, levied or collected upon coal or upon any improvements or other
rights, property, or assets produced, owned, or utilized in connection with the production
of coal except for income, sales, property or other similar taxes or fees of general applica-
tion which are not disproportionately imposed thereon."
H R. 6654, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Coal Severance Taxes: Hearings on H. 6625, HJ..
665, and H.A 7163 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Coal Severance Tax Hear-
ings]. The 97th Congress has reintroduced this bill under a different number. H.R. 4841, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
174. Id
175. Congress' power under the commerce clause is extremely broad. See Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (federal requirements imposed under commerce clause power applied
to out of the way Birmingham restaurant because it used meat which had been moved in interstate
commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (hotels and motels
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The greatest advantage of the proposed twelve and a half percent
limitation is simplicity. A federally imposed tax ceiling allows the judi-
ciary to avoid a time consuming determination of whether a tax is
fairly related to services provided by the state. The proposed tax ceil-
ing also serves the main purpose of restraining a state's energy taxing
power and prevents any state severance tax on coal from reaching out-
rageously high rates.
This simplicity, however, also leads to the bill's primary disadvan-
tage-inefficiency. Setting an inflexible rate of taxation risks forcing a
coal exporting state to absorb governmental costs properly attributable
to nonresident coal consumers. 176 The state's actual costs might exceed
the amount of revenues obtainable with a twelve and a half percent tax.
Residents of coal exporting states should not have to pay for coal
shipped to nonresidents. If a state needs more than a twelve and a half
percent tax rate to recoup the legitimate 17 7 costs incurred as a result of
the coal industry's impact, then the proposed bill would lead to an in-
equitable situation.
While an unfairly low rate in some situations, the twelve and a half
percent rate is too high in other situations. In some states, a twelve and
a half percent tax rate arguably exceeds the rate necessary for the state
to recoup its costs stemming from the coal industry.1 78 Enactment of
the proposed bill will render the fairly related issue moot for severance
affect interstate travel and are thus subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (federal regulation of crops applied to a local farmer);
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) (upheld federal fixing of minimum
prices to be paid to milk producers in Chicago). An argument to restrain Congress' action in this
area may arise from National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The chances of
success with such an argument are left to speculation. For discussion of intergovernmental taxa-
tion immunities, see Dam, he American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 271, 290-91
(1977); Hellerstein, supra note 87, at 252-53.
176. Clearly, interstate commerce must pay its way. See note 153 supra and accompanying
text.
177. North Dakota, for example, may eventually have actual costs exceeding the amount of
revenues obtainable with a 12V% limit. Because North Dakota generates electricity for export in
addition to mining, special costs are incurred. The generating plants release sulphur dioxide into
the air and use large amounts of the state's scarce water supply. Added to the existing costs
associated with coal mining itself, these special costs may place North Dakota in an incongruous
situation if recouping its costs are limited to a 121h% rate. See Brief Amicus Curiae of The North
Dakota State Tax Commissioner at 6, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, - Mont. ._, 615
P.2d 847 (1980).
178. One researcher concluded that Montana could recoup all of her costs by other existing
taxes and restrictions. See Coal Severance Tax Hearings, su ra note 173, at 274-75, 296 (statement
of Irwin M. Stelzer).
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taxes up to twelve and a half percent.1 79 A simple illustration reveals
the harm of legislatively abrogating the need for a state to set its tax in
relation to services provided. Under the proposed bill a state that actu-
ally needs only a small tax to recoup its costs can nevertheless tax up to
twelve and a half percent without any judicial interference on com-
merce clause grounds. If such a state exports a large percentage of coal
produced within its boundaries, then the nation unnecessarily suffers
the adverse effects associated with higher energy costs.18 0 The pro-
posed bill, in an effort to prevent unnecessarily high severance tax
rates, may thus permit and even encourage these unnecessarily burden-
some rates.
A much more accurate and efficient legislative alternative would be
to create an agency to regulate the rate of coal taxation. An agency is
the ideal entity for accurately determining the cost to a state of the coal
industry's activity.' The majority of the country's low-sulphur coal,
however, exists in only a few states."8 2 Creating a federal agency solely
to monitor the coal-related costs incurred by these few states is bureau-
cratic overkill, inconsistent with the growing intolerance of excessive
federal agency regulation. 8 '
VI. CONCLUSION
Energy is of such great importance to the nation that states should
not be allowed to tax energy resources at any rate they desire. A state
levy must reasonably approximate the actual governmental costs aris-
ing from the intrastate aspects of the interstate activity.'8 Because in-
creased energy costs have a major impact on the nation,18 5 states must
not tax energy resources at an unjustified rate.18 6 The national signifi-
cance of energy should compel the courts to shoulder the task of mak-
ing a full factual inquiry into whether a state tax fairly relates to the
services provided by the state. In addition, courts hearing challenges to
energy taxes should shift the burden onto the taxing state to prove that
179. Rates up to 12 % would have Congressional approval.
180. See notes 128-52 supra and accompanying text.
181. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMrNIsTRATVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS
3-5 (7th ed. 1979).
182. See Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 133.
183. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 181, at 79-80.
184. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 128-52 supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 70, 155 & 161 supra and accompanying text.
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the tax approximates the state's costs.18 7 If the Supreme Court in Com-
monwealth Edison had given substance to the Complete Auto fairly re-
lated requirement, the commerce clause would have prevented energy-
rich states from taxing at rates that unjustifiably burden interstate com-
merce and the nation. If the judiciary continues to refuse to give effect
to the commerce clause, Congress may have to act to rectify the situa-
tion. The recently proposed bill1 88 setting an inflexible severance tax
ceiling suffers from oversimplification. Residents of states with legiti-
mate coal-related costs greater than the amount recoverable with a
twelve and a half percent tax will absorb part of the costs for nonresi-
dents' coal. The proposed legislation also permits a state with rela-
tively low coal-related governmental costs to tax at a rate of up to
twelve and a half percent without fear that the judiciary will scrutinize
the fairness of the rate. The bill could thus protect-not prevent-
unjustifiable and unnecessary burdens on interstate commerce and the
nation. The legislative alternative of establishing an agency to monitor
states' coal-related expenditures and corresponding tax rates would
provide the most accurate method of determining fair rates. Creating a
new agency, however, requires unnecessary growth of federal bureau-
cracy. 8 9 Commerce clause scrutiny by the judiciary is the most func-
tional method of preventing energy-rich states from exploiting their
resources at the expense of the nation as a whole. 190 In matters con-
cerning the commerce clause, the judiciary is the "final arbiter of the
competing demands of state and national interests."191
Edward Abraham Cohen
187. See notes 164-67 supra and accompanying text.
188. See note 173 supra.
189. See note 183 supra and accompanying text.
190. The problems that would be caused by enactment of the proposed bill or the creation of
an agency would result in significantly greater problems than requiring courts to make factual
records, something they do on a daily basis.
191. Japan Lines, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979).
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